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Introduction
The quality and safety of Irish agricultural product will 
become increasingly important, if Ireland is to remain 
competitive in a global trading environment. Animal 
health is an important contributor to on-farm profitability, 
as well as food quality and safety, and the international 
competitiveness of livestock and livestock products. The 
health status of the national herd, now and into the future, 
is an important issue for consideration.
Animal health services have both local and national 
components. This paper specifically focuses on national 
animal health services, which encompasses the systems 
(including organisations and infrastructure) and processes 
(for example, policy development, programme formulation 
and delivery) that facilitate national coordination of efforts 
towards improved animal health in the national herd.
In the past 12 months, there has been growing interest 
in the work of Ireland’s national animal health services 
(McCarthy, 2007; More, 2007). In particular, it has been 
suggested that the scope of this work be expanded, to 
address a range of non-regulatory animal health issues, 
including Johne’s disease, infectious bovine rhinotracheitis 
(IBR) and mastitis. However, as part of this discussion, 
there has been concern from within both government 
and industry as to the respective roles and responsibilities 
(both financial and otherwise) of government and 
industry in any such moves. Drawing on theoretical 
considerations and country case studies (from Ireland, 
the Netherlands and Australia), this paper argues the 
case for increased private sector involvement in Ireland’s 
national animal health services. The Netherlands and 
Australia, like Ireland, are each heavily reliant upon the 
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export of livestock and livestock products. Ireland and the 
Netherlands operate within the protections and constraints 
afforded by the European Union, whereas Australia does 
not.
Public and private sector involvement in 
national animal health services: theoretical 
considerations
a. Criteria for public and private sector involvement
Public funds are finite, and governments need objective 
criteria to enable the equitable and appropriate allocation 
of these funds. Generally, these criteria are based on the 
concept that public funds are used to support public goods 
and services (Umali et	al., 1994), but not those of a private 
nature. Public goods and services (for example, national 
institutions for law and order, public roads, education, 
hospitals etc.) are generally funded through compulsory 
taxation and are, therefore, available to all. In economic 
terms, public and private goods are distinguished using the 
principles of excludability and rivalry. Purely public goods 
are those goods from which it is not possible to exclude one 
consumer without excluding all (non-excludability) and 
of which the consumption by one person does not reduce 
its availability for consumption by others (non-rivalry) 
(Ahuja, 2004). Conversely, purely private goods are fully 
excludable and rivalrous. Some goods and services lie 
between these extremes; in particular, goods and services 
with externalities (or spillover effects) (Umali et	al., 1994).
The concepts of public and private good are applicable to 
animal health services, since each service can be classified 
according to its economic character (Umali et al., 1994). 
Using these criteria, several authors have defined public 
and private sector roles in the provision of animal health 
services (Holden, 1999; Ahuja, 2004). As an illustration, 
veterinary epidemiological services are primarily 
considered a public good (the information provided is of 
benefit to the community, and cannot be appropriated by a 
single individual), whereas diagnostic services may provide 
elements of both private and public good, depending on 
the degree to which externalities are produced (Umali et 
al., 1994). A national mastitis programme has the potential 
to provide benefits to dairy farmers and processors, but 
with limited additional benefits to the broader human 
population. Therefore, this programme would primarily 
be considered a private (or industry) good.
It is widely accepted that the public and private sectors 
each have a role to play in improving animal health 
(Ekboir, 1999; Holden 1999; Sen and Chander, 2003). 
However, there is considerable debate about the balance 
between the two (Ekboir, 1999). In a recent submission 
to DG Sanco, the Swedish Ministry of Agriculture, Food 
and Consumer Affairs suggested that public measures 
should be limited to animal diseases with public health 
risks, an environmental dimension and/or symptoms 
similar to dangerous animal disease, diseases that are 
highly contagious, diseases where knowledge is lacking 
and diseases that can be widely spread without detection 
(Anon., 2006a). Similarly, Ekboir (1999) suggested 
that public intervention in the development and 
implementation of animal health policies should be guided 
by:
•  Whether the targeted disease can affect humans;
•  Its degree of contagiousness;
•  Whether it is endemic or epidemic; and,
•  The economic costs associated with the disease.
Bicknell et	al. (1999) highlight issues faced by a centralised 
animal health service (the Animal Health Board, 
responsible for the control of bovine tuberculosis in 
New Zealand) within a market-oriented economy; in 
particular, identification and implementation of policies 
to simultaneously encourage farmer participation and 
increased cost-recovery. Prompted in part by the rising 
costs associated with TB control, ‘responsibility- and cost-
sharing’ is an increasingly important issue in the United 
Kingdom (Anon., 2007a). Several authors have examined 
factors relevant to the transition from an exclusively-public 
model of veterinary services, with primary emphasis on the 
developing world (Schillhorn and de Haan, 1995; Sen and 
Chander, 2003; Brückner, 2004; Leonard, 2004).
Although efforts towards privatisation are being made 
(Sen and Chander, 2003), the national animal health 
services in many developing countries remain essentially 
a government responsibility (Schillhorn and de Haan, 
1995). In most developed countries, however, the allocation 
of public funds is increasingly guided by the principle 
of ‘who	benefits,	pays’. Using this approach, benefit 
flowing primarily to industry is distinguished from the 
broader public benefit. As a result, animal health services 
in developed countries are increasingly performed in 
partnership with, or have been transferred to, the private 
sector (Umali et	al., 1994).
b. Models of public and private sector involvement
National animal health services have frequently been 
regulated by government using the ‘command and 
control’ approach (Baldwin and Cave, 1999). The bovine 
tuberculosis control programme in Ireland is an example 
of this. Characteristics of this approach to governance 
(the rules, processes and behaviour that affect the way in 
which powers are exercised; Anon., 2004a) and regulation 
(primary and secondary legislation of government, rules 
and regulations of self-regulating bodies; Anon., 2004a) 
include ‘legal bindingness’, a rigid approach to 
implementation, predominantly public actors in policy-
making and a central locus of authority (Treib et al., 
2007). However, this approach has a number of inherent 
weaknesses, including the potential for undue influence 
(regulatory capture) by the regulated on the regulator, 
a tendency towards excessive legalism (a proliferation 
of unnecessarily complex and inflexible rules), creative 
compliance (the practice of avoiding the intention of a law 
without breaking its terms; Knill and Lenschow, 2003) and 
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the problems (including cost) of enforcement (Baldwin and 
Cave, 1999).
Government involvement in national animal health services 
need not equate to government control. There are many 
possible models of governance and regulation, ranging 
from government intervention (such as the ‘command 
and control’ model) through to societal autonomy (Treib 
et al., 2007). In some governance and regulation models, 
government plays no role (Egan, 2001). The ‘open method 
of communication’ (OMC) of the EU is one example of an 
alternative governance and regulation model (Knill and 
Lenschow, 2003), a second is co-management of natural 
resources (Pomeroy and Berkes, 1997; Carlsson and Berkes, 
2005), and a third is self-regulation (Baldwin and Cave, 
1999). The OMC is a relatively new form of governance 
that relies on the voluntary cooperation of EU member 
states. Using ‘soft law’ rather than treaty-based legislation, 
the OMC involves:
•  Guidelines	and	indicators:	policy guidelines for the EU as 
a whole, with short, medium and long term goals;
•  Benchmarking: quantitative and qualitative indicators for 
benchmarking national performance against the best in 
the world; and,
•  Sharing	of	best-practice:	periodic monitoring, evaluation 
and peer review of member states (Room, 2005).
In Ireland, ‘social partnership’ is one example of an 
inclusive partnership-based approach by the public and 
private sectors to governance and regulation (Anon., 
2007b). The national agreements, first introduced in 
1987, have been an important contributor to Ireland’s 
recent economic success (Hardiman, 2002). The farming 
community has been one of the social partners in each 
national agreement (Anon., 2007b).
Public and private sector involvement in national 
animal health services: case studies
a. Ireland
In Ireland to this point, national animal health services 
have been a government responsibility, through the 
Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (DAFF). 
DAFF implements EU policy and has responsibility for 
international trade, field operations, list A diseases and 
public health. It manages several disease eradication 
programmes, including bovine tuberculosis (More and 
Good, 2006), bovine brucellosis (Sheahan et	al., 2006) 
and bovine spongiform encephalopathy (Sheridan et	al., 
2005). The role of industry in policy development and 
the enforcement of EU regulation etc. is limited. Farmers 
contribute financially to the bovine and tuberculosis 
eradication programmes through compulsory disease 
levies (€0.0006 per litre of milk processed and €1.27 
per animal slaughtered or exported alive; Anon., 2006b), 
equivalent to €210 per typical Irish dairy farm (70 cows, 
annual production 5,000 litre per cow) or approx. €3.2 
million from the national dairy farming sector. Each 
farmer also pays for the private veterinary costs associated 
with one whole-herd tuberculin test each year. National 
laboratory support is provided through DAFF’s Veterinary 
Laboratory Service, which operates one central research 
and six regional laboratories. Farmers pay for non-
regulatory diagnostic work. Ireland’s national animal 
health services have some input into non-regulatory 
diseases of cattle and sheep (such as Johne’s disease, IBR 
and mastitis). Teagasc (the Irish Agriculture and Food 
Development Authority) provides advisory and research 
support for mastitis and fertility. In collaboration with the 
pig and poultry industries, government is coordinating 
a national Aujeszky’s disease control and eradication 
programme and enhanced Salmonella control through the 
Egg Quality Assurance Scheme, respectively.
Limited funding is available to support applied animal 
health research in Ireland, from both government and 
industry. The Research Stimulus Fund Programme 
supports ‘public good’ agri-production related research, 
using National Development Plan (2007-2013) funding. 
Industry provides support to Teagasc’s dairy research 
programme through the voluntary dairy research 
levy (€1.2 million in 2004) (McGuinness, 2004). This 
programme predominantly focuses on production, rather 
than health, issues.
There are a large number of industry organisations 
in Ireland representing farmers (e.g., Irish Farmers 
Association, Irish Creameries Milk Suppliers Association, 
Irish Cattle and Sheep Farmers’ Association), cooperatives 
(e.g., Irish Cooperative Organisation Society) and 
commodity-related businesses (e.g., Irish Dairy Industries 
Association). Further, national organisations are in place 
for product promotion, both nationally (e.g., National 
Dairy Council) and internationally (e.g., Irish Dairy 
Board).
b. The Netherlands
In the Netherlands, national animal health services are 
best understood by first considering the concept of product 
boards. Product boards (also known as commodity and 
industrial boards) were first established to contribute to 
post-war reconstruction, based on the principle that added 
value could be achieved through collective effort. Each 
product board operates under national legislation within 
a legal framework of a ‘statutory trade organisation’, 
and is authorised by government to formulate statutory 
rules in specific areas. They have the legal authority 
to establish regulations and impose levies, but are not 
government agencies. Each board acts in the interest of 
their sector as a whole and of society in general, adding 
value by raising standards in industry, addressing sector-
wide issues, improving working conditions, providing an 
alternative to government regulation, providing linkages 
with government, ensuring market transparency and 
encouraging innovation (Anon., 2004b). There are national 
commodity boards for primary production, including milk 
(Productschap Zuivel, PZ; the Dutch Dairy Board) and 
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livestock, meat and eggs (Productschappen Vee, Vlees en 
Eieren, PVE) and industrial boards in manufacturing, trade 
and logistics. Within each sector of primary production, 
the product board covers all relevant trade and product 
activities, from farmyard through to retail.
Established in 1956, the Dutch Dairy Board is a vertical 
organisation, incorporating bodies that represent dairy 
farmers, the dairy industry, traders, retail and trade unions. 
It also has close links with specialist organisations that 
provide services in animal health (GD Animal Health 
Service Deventer) and in milk quality assurance and 
control. With a workforce of approx. 100 people, the Dutch 
Dairy Board coordinates all national activities relating to 
the industry, including national dairy policy, international 
trade regulations (import and export) and sector regulations 
(quota, superlevy, milk premia). The organisation is 
financed through levies and payments. In 2007, levies of 
approx. €18 million were collected from dairy farmers 
(47%; €8.5 million in total), on-farm processors (1%) and 
the dairy processing industry (52%) and used to finance 
activities relating to research (dairy products, 26%; dairy 
farming, 31%), information and communication (25%) 
and cattle healthcare (18%). The Board is also reimbursed 
by the government for operating costs associated with 
implementation of European market regulations (approx. 
€7.2 million in 2007) (Anon., 2007c).
GD Animal Health Service is the primary provider of 
non-regulatory animal health services in the Netherlands. 
Initially founded by and for farmers in 1919, GD is now 
an autonomous and independent operating enterprise. 
During 2005, GD had a turnover of €47.1 million, and a 
staff of 420 (full-time equivalent) (Anon., 2005a). GD is 
highly respected internationally, particularly in the areas 
of animal health diagnostics, animal health programmes 
and animal disease monitoring. Through the activities of 
GD, the Netherlands is leading international efforts in the 
implementation of voluntary animal health programmes 
(such as Johne’s disease; Kalis et	al., 2004; Weber et	al., 
2006). GD is coordinating Uier Gezondheids Centrum 
Nederland (UGCN; the Dutch Udder Health Centre), 
a national five-year programme to decrease mastitis 
incidence. This work is funded by the Dutch Dairy Board, 
and coordinated by GD under a steering committee, 
comprising farmers (Dutch Organisation for Agriculture 
and Horticulture; LTO, Land- en Tuinbouw Organisatie 
Nederland), industry (Dutch Dairy Association; NZO, 
De Nederlandse Zuivel Organisatie) and the Dutch Dairy 
Board.
The contribution of the Dutch government to national 
animal health services is essentially limited to activities in 
fulfillment of EU and international regulatory obligations. 
This work is coordinated through the national Ministry of 
Agriculture, Nature and Food Quality (LNV; Landbouw, 
Natuur en Voedselkwaliteit). The Food and Consumer 
Product Safety Agency (VWA), an independent agency of 
LNV, has a range of responsibilities including notifiable 
animal disease control, export certification, regulatory 
control of the meat sectors, and oversight of the work 
of the Netherlands Controlling Authority for Milk and 
Milk Products (COKZ) (Anon., 2006c). Since mid-2007, 
COKZ has formed part of Qlip (Kwaliteitsborging in de 
Zuivelketen), the central organisation for quality assurance 
in the Dutch dairy sector (Anon., 2007d). In the area of 
notifiable disease control, VWA works closely with other 
organisations including the Central Institute for Animal 
Disease Control (CIDC-Lelystad, the national reference 
laboratory) and GD Animal Health Service. Testing for 
export certification is conducted by both CIDC-Lelystad 
and other laboratories, such as GD Animal Health Service.
Cost-sharing is a key principle underpinning the funding 
of animal health services in the Netherlands. In a recent 
position paper, the ministry stated that “farmers	and	others	
who	create	income	(from)	animals…	must	make	a	substantial	
contribution	to	the	costs	incurred	by	government	for	the	
monitoring	and	control	of	animal	diseases” (Anon., 2006d). 
Given its contribution to both public and private good, 
animal disease surveillance activities are funded 50% each 
by government and industry. In contrast, non-regulatory 
animal health issues are considered the sole responsibility 
of industry. At times, government does provide some 
contribution to the development of new non-regulatory 
animal health programmes, however, in all cases these 
contributions is restricted to defined projects, and used to 
support innovation (as opposed to operations). On-farm 
costs relating to voluntary animal health programmes, 
including the cost of sample collection and laboratory 
testing, are borne by individual farmers. Although 
financial details are commercial-in-confidence (confidential 
information), the operating model of GD Animal Health 
Service is essentially full cost-recovery.
c. Australia
Government is responsible for defined aspects of the 
national animal health services in Australia. The federal 
government (through the national Department of 
Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry) has responsibility 
for quarantine, international animal health matters and 
the formulation and coordination of national policy. The 
Australian Quarantine and Inspection Service (AQIS), 
as part of the Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and 
Forestry, is responsible for the delivery of quarantine 
import requirements and export health certification. Most 
aspects of this service are operated on a full cost-recovery 
basis. State and territory governments are responsible for 
disease control, surveillance and eradication within their 
own borders. Consultative committees ensure that these 
bodies work together (Anon., 2006e).
Industry plays a key role in many aspects of the national 
animal health services, either through industry/government 
partnership bodies (e.g., Animal Health Australia) or 
essentially independent of government (e.g., Dairy 
Australia).
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Animal Health Australia (AHA) is a not-for-profit 
public company established in 1996 by the federal, state 
and territory governments and major national livestock 
industry organisations. It is a key contributor to national 
policies in animal health, and in the facilitation of 
partnerships between government and industry. Through 
AHA, the livestock industries participate in national policy 
development, provide substantial financial support to 
targeted activities and contribute to emergency responses 
(Anon., 2006e). Currently, AHA services runs eight major 
programme areas, including animal disease surveillance, 
emergency animal disease preparedness, animal health 
services, special programmes, Johne’s disease control 
programmes and training. As part of emergency disease 
preparedness, AHA has developed detailed contingency 
plans (AUSVETPLANs) focusing on disease strategies, as 
well as operational, enterprise and management manuals. 
Further, an Emergency Animal Disease (EAD) Response 
Agreement was negotiated between government and 
industry in 2001, clearly defining obligations (financial and 
otherwise) in the event of an exotic disease outbreak. EADs 
are classified according to their impacts on human health, 
the environment and livestock industries (trade losses, 
national market disruption, production losses) and cost-
sharing (covering salaries and wages, operating expenses, 
capital costs and compensation) varies accordingly.
AHA’s industry partners include a range of national 
producer-owned industry organisations (for example, 
Australian Pork Limited, Dairy Australia and Meat 
and Livestock Australia). These organisations operate 
under national legislation, and have a broad range of 
responsibilities including marketing, export development, 
research, innovation and strategic policy development. For 
example, the goal of Dairy Australia is:
“to	deliver	the	services	needed	by	the	Australian	dairy	industry	
for	its	ongoing	and	future	development	as	a	competitive,	
innovative	and	sustainable	dairy	industry	that	contributes	to	
the	overall	prosperity	of	Australian	and	regional	economies.”
Each organisation is managed by industry, and owned 
by its members (farmers and industry bodies). The 
organisations are subject to periodic independent review 
(Hassall and Associates, 2006). They are primarily 
supported by industry levies, which are collected under 
national legislation by the Levies Revenue Service. During 
2005/06, AUD32.3 million (approx. €19.4 million; based 
on AUD0.026448 per kg fat plus AUD0.064438 per kg 
protein) was collected from dairy farmers, to support Dairy 
Australia, including its contribution to AHA’s animal 
health programmes. This is equivalent to AUD1,194 
(approx. €714) per typical Irish dairy farm (70 cows, 
annual production 5,000 litre per cow, average 3.4% fat 
and 3.9% protein). Similarly, approx. AUD81 million 
(based on AUD5.00 per head [grass and feedlot cattle], 
AUD0.90 per head [bobby calves], 2% of sale price to a 
max. AUD0.20 for sheep and AUD1.50 for prime lambs, 
AUD0.377 per head [goats]) was collected in transaction 
levies from beef and sheep producers in 2005/06 to fund 
Meat and Livestock Australia, including its contribution 
to AHA’s animal health programmes. On January 1, 2006, 
the cattle transaction levy was raised from AUD3.50 to 
AUD5.00 per head. This decision was taken by the beef 
industry, based on an assessment of future programmes 
and funding needs (Anon., 2005b) and following a 
ballot (with 57.7% in favour) of its members. Levies are 
recognised as an effective mechanism to pool effort and 
resource thereby enabling industries to collectively address 
priority issues.
The genesis of current national structures for animal 
health services in Australia, and particularly the key role 
of industry, can be traced back to 1983 (Lehane, 1996). 
To this point, the national Brucellosis and Tuberculosis 
Eradication Campaign (BTEC) had progressed smoothly 
in southern Australia, and a number of areas had 
achieved disease freedom. By 1983, eradication efforts 
were increasingly focused on northern Australia. In 
these areas, however, there were limited facilities for 
cattle management, and eradication efforts were greatly 
hampered by difficulties associated with the clean 
(complete) muster of cattle from many outback properties. 
To progress eradication, key decisions were made by 
the central (Canberra-based) technical committee which 
raised increasing concern among northern producers. 
Indeed, at the time, Lehane (1996) recalls comments in one 
newspaper:
“Cattlemen	fear	for	their	future	as	the	bureaucrats	ride	in.	
Right	across	northern	Australia…	there	is	a	galloping	sense	of	
fear	at	the	looming	prospect	of	the	destruction	of	the	northern	
cattle	industry.”
The national stalemate that ensued was eventually resolved 
following the decision of the national Minister of Primary 
Industries, who indicated that programme management 
would be based on equal representation from industry and 
government. From that point, the roles and responsibilities 
(both financial and otherwise) were shared and clearly 
defined for both industry and government. In a recent 
review, Radunz (2006) suggested that the involvement 
of industry in both funding and policy development was 
seen as a critical factor in the eventual success in this 
programme. Similarly, Whittem (1998) highlighted the key 
role of industry leadership in the financing and oversight 
of the program, suggesting that it was a sine	qua	non for its 
success.
The performance of the national animal health 
services
a. Regulatory animal health issues
The export of animals and/or animal products is a 
critical contributor to the national economies of Ireland, 
the Netherlands and Australia. In 2005, these countries 
were the fifth, third and first largest international beef 
exporters, and the fourth, second and eighth largest butter 
exporters, by value, respectively (International Trade 
Centre UNCTAD/WTO, 2005). International regulatory 
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obligations (in the case of Ireland and the Netherlands, 
also EU obligations) are fundamental to unhindered 
international trade and a central priority for the national 
animal health services in each country. Given this 
background, there are many examples among each of the 
national services of international leadership and research 
innovation in the area of regulatory animal health (Bouma 
et	al., 2003; More et	al.,	2006; Martin et	al.,	2007a,b). Under 
international and EU legislation, government is considered 
the competent central authority, and these activities must 
be conducted by government, or under its direction. In 
Ireland, this work is funded primarily by government. In 
contrast, in both Australia and the Netherlands, industry 
contributes to (in some circumstances covers the full cost 
of) government regulatory activities (e.g., surveillance in 
the Netherlands, quarantine and inspection in Australia).
b. Non-regulatory animal health issues
The Netherlands and Australia are each making rapid 
progress in addressing a range of issues concerning non-
regulatory animal health. The national mastitis and Johne’s 
disease programmes in the Netherlands and Australia, 
and the InCalf (fertility) programme in Australia, are each 
considered international leaders, and each is effectively 
translating knowledge into substantial progress on the 
ground.
Progress in non-regulatory animal health issues in 
Ireland is limited to the pig and poultry sectors, through 
the Aujeszky’s and enhanced salmonellosis control 
programmes, respectively. In the cattle and sheep industries, 
equivalent programmes have not been established.
Addressing non-regulatory animal health issues: 
potential lessons from the Netherlands and 
Australia
The above-mentioned discussion highlights limitations 
with the scope, but not the quality, of Ireland’s national 
animal health services. In those areas within the current 
remit of the Irish animal health services (that is, regulatory 
animal health), Ireland’s progress is not dissimilar to that 
achieved in comparable countries. However, it will be in 
Ireland’s long-term interest to broaden the scope of these 
services, given the increasing impact of non-regulatory 
animal health issues in global trade (More, 2007). In both 
Australia and the Netherlands, this gap has been addressed 
through a very substantial increase in industry involvement 
in the national animal health services. I contend that similar 
moves are needed here.
a. Public sector involvement
In both the Netherlands and Australia, the allocation 
of public funds in the national animal health services is 
guided by the principle of ‘who	benefits,	pays’. The Dutch 
position is reflected in a recent position paper (Anon., 
2006d), where the authors argue that government funding 
for disease control should be considered on a sliding scale: 
“the	greater	the	external	effects	on	monitoring	and	control,	the	
greater	the	justification	for	government	involvement	(direct	and	
financial).” In this situation, ‘external effects’ can be equated 
with ‘public good’. Australia has reached almost identical 
conclusions, as reflected in the cost-sharing arrangement 
between government and livestock industry within the 
Emergency Animal Disease Response Agreement (Figure 
1). Industry bodies also reflect a clear commitment to the 
division between public and private good. As one example, 
it is the responsibility of Dairy Australia (an industry body), 
and not government, to help “the	(national)	dairy	industry	
to	be	collaborative,	innovative,	sustainable	and	competitive	
against	both	international	dairy	industries	and	substitute	
products”. This organisation is funded entirely through 
industry levies, apart from government contributions (with 
government matching industry funds on a 50:50 basis) to 
research and development.
There are substantial constraints on the use of EU and 
national government funds to support the national animal 
health services in the Netherlands. As an EU member state, 
these constraints are also relevant to Ireland. Three key 
issues are important:
•  There is substantial government support (through the 
European Commission for Agriculture; DG Agriculture) 
for the agricultural sector through the common 
agricultural policy (Anon., 2004c). The stated aims of the 
Category 1 (100% government)
(rabies, Japanese encephalitis, Australian lyssaviruses, Nipah 
virus, the equine encephalitides)
Emergency animal diseases that predominantly seriously affect 
human health and/or the environment (depletion of native fauna) 
but may only have minimal direct consequences to the livestock 
industries.
Category 2 (80% government: 20% industry)
(e.g., highly pathogenic avian influenza, bovine brucellosis, BSE, 
classical swine fever, foot and mouth disease)
Emergency animal diseases that have the potential to cause 
major national socioeconomic consequences through very 
serious international trade losses, national market disruptions 
and very severe production losses in the livestock industries 
that are involved. This category includes diseases that may 
have a slightly lower national socio-economic consequences, 
but also have significant public health and/or environmental 
consequences.
Category 3 (50% government: 50% industry)
(e.g., African Horse Sickness, bovine tuberculosis, scrapie)
Emergency animal diseases that have the potential to cause 
significant (but generally moderate) national socio-economic 
consequences through international trade losses, market 
disruptions involving two or more states and severe production 
losses to affected industries, but have minimal or no affect on 
human health or the environment.
Category 4 (20% government: 80% industry)
(e.g., Aujeszky’s disease, contagious equine metritis, sheep scab)
Diseases that could be classified as being mainly production loss 
diseases. While there may be international trade losses and local 
market disruptions, these would not be of a magnitude that would 
be expected to significantly affect the national economy. The main 
beneficiaries of a successful emergency response to an outbreak 
of such a disease would be the affected livestock industry(s).
Figure 1: The cost-sharing arrangement between government and livestock industry 
within Australia’s Emergency Animal Disease Response Agreement (Source: http://
www.animalhealthaustralia.com.au/programs/eadp/eadra.cfm).
IVJ Feb 2008.indd   97 21/01/2008   12:18:02Irish Veterinary Journal Volume 61 Number 2
98 peer reviewed
policy are to “provide	farmers	with	a	reasonable	standard	
of	living,	consumers	with	quality	food	at	fair	prices	and	to	
preserve	Europe’s	rural	heritage”.
•  Further, through the European Commission for 
Health and Consumer Protection (DG SANCO), 
the Community Animal Health Policy (CAHP) 
provides EU-level support for strategies to prevent the 
introduction of exotic diseases and to eradicate and 
monitor some animal diseases that are still present in 
some areas of the community. A strategy document 
for 2007-2013 was recently released (Anon., 2007e), 
with particular emphasis on policy coordination, the 
refinement of integrated risk management strategies for 
disease prevention and a harmonised EU framework 
for public-private cost-sharing (Food Chain Evaluation 
Consortium, 2006).
•  Beyond this, support is constrained by EU competition 
policy, which seeks to prevent distortion of the EU 
internal market through unfair competition, whilst 
respecting international commitments through the 
World Trade Organization (WTO). The WTO’s 
Agreement on Agriculture provides a negotiated 
framework for increased market orientation in 
international agricultural trade, including provisions 
that encourage the use of less trade-distorting domestic 
support policies to maintain the rural economy (Anon., 
2007f). Detailed EU guidelines have been developed 
for the application of government support (so-called 
‘state aid’) in the livestock sector. State aid can only be 
used to combat animal diseases “of	concern	(to)	public	
authorities”, and “not	measures	for	which	farmers	must	
reasonably	take	responsibility	themselves”	(Anon., 2002, 
2006f). These provisions may be reviewed, as part of the 
current CAHP review (Anon., 2006f). Provisions are 
made for the use of state aid in technical support and in 
research and development (Anon., 2000, 2006f). 
These findings highlight a number of issues, which may 
be relevant to Ireland as it considers broadening the 
scope of its national animal health services. The roles and 
responsibilities of government in the national animal health 
services, and the principles underpinning this involvement, 
must be clearly stated. These principles should be clearly 
communicated to relevant stakeholders, as should the 
boundaries of government involvement. The involvement 
of government, beyond current regulatory animal health 
issues, is constrained by EU policy.
c. Private sector involvement
Co-management by government and industry is a key 
feature in the Dutch and Australian national animal health 
services. Under national legislation, industry organisations 
have national responsibility for a broad portfolio of 
sector-level issues, including national policy development, 
sector-relevant research and development; information 
collection, analysis and dissemination; issues management; 
national marketing; and international trade development. 
In other words, industry plays the leading role in shaping 
its own future. Although a range of industry organisations 
are involved, each has defined roles and responsibilities. 
In each country, non-regulatory animal health issues are 
essentially a remit of industry. In the Netherlands, this is 
primarily conducted by GD Animal Health Service; in 
Australia, Animal Health Australia is responsible for multi-
sector issues and defined industry organisations (such as 
Dairy Australia) for single-sector issues. Strategic planning 
is a key feature in each country; as an example, Dairy 
Australia is guided by a five-year (2007-2011) strategic 
plan, which is translated into operational plans annually. 
This organisation must comply with published principles 
of corporate governance, and is evaluated independently 
every three years against both its strategic and annual 
operational plans and the value for money it provides levy 
payers (Hassall and Associates, 2006). Industry financial 
support, through compulsory industry levies, has evolved 
into a key component of centralised animal health service in 
each country. In Australia, the imposition of levies, and the 
level at which they are applied, is determined by respective 
industry groups. The sole role of government, through 
the Levies Revenue Service, concerns the administration, 
collection and disbursement of these monies.
These findings highlight a number of additional issues, 
which are of potential relevance to Ireland. Within clear 
limits, which are predominantly defined by international 
and (as relevant) EU legislation, the Dutch and Australian 
industries have the ability to shape their own future. 
The national animal health services are co-managed by 
government and industry, each with clearly defined roles 
and responsibilities. Non-regulatory animal health issues 
are primarily the responsibility of the private sector, in 
both countries with substantial technical support from 
appropriate organisations and people. Financial support for 
these activities is almost exclusively from industry, through 
compulsory levies. In these countries, industry structures 
facilitate whole-of-sector cooperation.
Conclusion
This paper has considered the role of the private sector in 
national animal health services, based on both theoretical 
considerations and country case studies. Each supports the 
case for increased private sector involvement in Ireland’s 
national animal health services. Furthermore, the Dutch 
and Australian case studies present examples of successful 
partnerships between government and industry, including 
systems and processes to address non-regulatory animal 
health issues. It will be in Ireland’s long-term interest to 
broaden the scope of its national animal health services, 
through increased private sector involvement, given the 
increasing impact of non-regulatory animal health issues in 
global trade.
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